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IN SEARCH OF A FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLEt
Mark G. Yudo_r
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY. By Frederick Schauer.
New York: Cambridge University Press. 1982. Pp. xiv, 237. Cloth,
$37.50; paper, $9.95.

[I]he lesson ofthe past two hundredyears is that we will do well to he on
our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems. 1

Many scholarly works on freedom of expression are reminiscent
of maps in the middle ages. They are more symbolic than real, more
reflections of faith than observed facts. The style is "symbolic, ornamental, and often beautiful; the . . . content, impoverished and usually misleading; the purposes, a representation of the mind more
than of the Earth." 2 From this perspective, Frederick Schauer is the
Mercator of modem first amendment theorists, eschewing blind faith
and hackneyed metaphors and embracing analytical and empirical
methods. In Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, Schauer disentangles and meticulously parses the traditional arguments for free
speech, those based on the quest for truth, democracy, self-realization, and individual dignity and autonomy. If he errs in ignoring the
synergistic nature of those arguments, he succeeds in calling to our
attention the relationship between freedom of expression and the
general tenets of nineteenth-century liberalism. He challenges the
faithful to distinguish between government regulation of speech and
regulation of all manner of human conduct (pp. 71, 94). 3 Professor
Schauer relentlessly pursues a unitary principle of freedom of expression, aspiring to "an objective and universal standpoint."4 He
attempts "to walk out of the cave, leave the city, climb the moun-

t

I am grateful to David Anderson, Steven Goode, Sanford Levinson, William Powers,
and Michael Sharlot for their criticisms and suggestions.
• Associate Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas
School of Law. B.A. 1965; LL.B. 1968, University of Pennsylvania. Professor Yudof is the
author of WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983) and a coauthor of EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND
THE LAW (2d ed. 1983). - Ed.
l. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977).
2. J. WILFORD, THE MAPMAKERS 45 (1981); see also THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER:
SELECTED EsSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 60 (1981) ("Most of the literature of freedom is in essence exhortatory and quite innocent of any intention toward analytical profundity.").
3. See generally Bork, On Constitutional Economics, 1 REG., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 14; Coase,
The Market far Goods and the Market far Ideas, 64 AMER. EcoN. REV., PAPERS & PROC. 384
(1974).
4. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE xiv (1983) (reviewed in this issue).
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tain," and survey the philosophical terrain from a distance. But he is
equally willing "to stand in the cave, in the city, on the ground." 5
I

Schauer frees himself of much excess baggage by declining to
discuss the specific meaning of the first amendment. He is not concerned with the positivist constraints of the language, text, and history of that amendment, nor is he much inclined to rehash decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. He wants to explore the principles that may undergird freedom of expression. He is interested in
illuminating matters of political philosophy, in estimating the consequences of differing approaches, in probing for inconsistencies and
common threads. To be sure, he is concerned with defining
"speech" and "liberty" (pp. 89-130), but his framework is more conceptual than legal (pp. ix-x). His emphasis is on conceptual clarity,
on reducing analytical confusion. Thus Schauer divides his book
into three parts: "The Free Speech Principle," "Explication," and
"Applications." Broadly speaking, his aim is to connect political philosophy to law, with law being the dependent variable.
Professor Schauer begins by distinguishing between "independent principles" and those that are components of larger principles
(p. 5). He suggests that we typically treat free speech as an independent principle, and that it must be so treated if it is to have
"power and survivability" (p. 6):
Our intuitions may be erroneous. They do suggest, however, that enquiring into the foundations of an independent principle of free speech
would be fruitful. If such foundations exist, free speech will emerge as
an independent principle. . . . But if there are no sturdy foundations,
if there is no principle of free speech independent of a more general
liberty, then free speech is more a platitude than a principle. [P. 6].

The distinction between independent and dependent principles allows Schauer to urge that the question of free speech should be separated from the question of the general authority of the state to limit
individual liberty (p. 7). While liberty may be an aspect of free
speech (p. 7), he suggests that an independent free speech principle
should not necessarily bind its proponents to concepts of the minimal state.
The urge to identify an independent free speech principle, to separate the importance of expression from general principles of libertarianism, lands Schauer in some considerable difficulties. As he
grudgingly admits (p. 7), nearly all principles can be subsumed
under broader principles.6 Democracy or equality might be compo5. Id.
6. See Sokolow, Book Review (unpublished review of FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY) (1983) (on file with author).
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nents of a broader principle of justice, liberty, or utility. 7 By requiring independence, and by limiting arguments to those that would
uniquely support a distinct principle, he may doom the case for free
speech in advance. Free speech may not be an independent principle, and therefore a mere "platitude" in Schauer's lexicon, or it may
be an independent principle with inconclusive justifications.
Equally important, the search for "the" free speech principle
leads Schauer, in large part, to discuss the justifications for freedom
of expression in isolation from each other, ignoring their cumulative
and synergistic effects. For example, one may not believe that free
expression invariably advances the truth, strengthens individual autonomy, or is a necessary condition for democracy. But the three
arguments together might well support a free speech principle,
whereas no single argument would be persuasive. And if one believes, for example, that democratic governments are more likely to
protect individual autonomy, the overall impact of freedom of
speech may be greater than the sum of the component justifications:
the interaction of principles may create synergistic effects.
Let me give an example of the difficulties with Schauer's approach. He suggests that the self-realization justification for freedom
of speech "suffers from a failure to distinguish intellectual self-fulfilment from other wants and needs, and thus fails to support a distinct
principle of free speech" (p. 56). Even if it is true that communication may produce self-fulfillment, the same result can be produced
by other experiences, e.g. , "world travel," "keen observation," or
"changing employment every year" (p. 57). Ergo, self-fulfillment is
a subprinciple of freedom, and "tells us nothing in particular about
freedom of speech" (p. 58). Thus, "to the extent that a given society
or government has for some reason elected to limit individual liberty
in the broad sense, there remains no reason freedom of speech
should not be subject to equivalent limitations" (p. 58). But suppose
that speech, unlike a holiday in Rome, advances self-realization and
contributes to the survival of democracy. Or that suppression of
speech is more of an affront t_o an individual's dignity than regulation of travel abroad. Or that government decisionmakers are more
likely to be biased in speech than travel cases. A holistic argument,
premised on a number of justificatic-;s, might well yield a principle
that supports a strong presumption for free speech.
Schauer's philosophical method produces other problems. The
quest for an independent principle is quickly turned into a quest for
a simple principle, an Occam's Razor. As Michael Sokolow has suggested in an unpublished review of Free Speech, one might create
and examine a single complex principle rather than many simple
ones:
7. See, e.g., Redish, The Value

ef Free Speech,

130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982),
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If speech does not offend so as to provoke others to violence and is not
a falsehood that will undermine the judicial system's search for truth,
and is more likely than not to lead to democracy, truth, and individual
fulfillment, and is not a known falsehood uttered to ruin the reputation
of a third party, then government cannot prohibit the utterance of that
speech.8

At some point, so many nodules are added to a principle that it perhaps may no longer qualify as a principle. A new "paradigm" may
emerge that incorporates the old theory and its many quali:ficatiohs.9
But the emphasis on independence appears to preclude, at least for
this author, the formulation of a complex principle that embo4ies a
variety of justifications. Schauer notes at one point that free speech
may involve a collection of distinct but interrelated principles (p. 14),
but he is content to treat relatively simple principles, one at a time,
without attempting a holistic analysis. In this regard, he may be invoking an analytical technique more common to constitutional lawyers than to philosophers. Io
One way to create a simple and independent principle of free
expression is to assume that speech is self-regarding, that is that it
does not have an effect on others. If this were true, then regulation
of speech might be impermissible whereas regulation of other-regarding conduct would be permissible. The analogy would be to assertedly "victimless crimes." To Schauer's credit, he cogently
demonstrates that speech is nearly always other-regarding:
Speech is plainly not a self-regarding act, even assuming there be a
category of acts that are self-regarding. Affecting others is most often
the whole point of speaking. There are words, such as 'deceive', 'persuade', 'convince', and 'mislead', whose very logic presupposes that
speech acts will affect others. [P. 10].

Speech may be protected despite its impact on others or, in some
circumstances, precisely because it is thought to influence others.
But speech is not protected as a part of the Millian private sphere of
action.II
The problem with Schauer's treatment of speech as other-regarding is that this apt characterization does not resolve questions of
magnitude or of causation. He rightly argues that speech may damage a person's reputation, humiliate him, invade his privacy, or
cause him to disobey the law (p. 10). And I have argued that government expression, for example the condemnation of a public employee as a felon or communist, may hurt a person as much as
8. Sokolow, supra note 6, at 7.
9. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFlC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); K.
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (rev. ed. 1979).
10. See, for example, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
11. See generally Scanlon, Freedom ofExpression and Categories ofExpression, 40 U. PITT.
L. REV. 519 (1979).
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physical incarceration or a taking of property. 12 But it does not follow that no distinction may be drawn between other-regarding
speech and other-regarding acts, or that "libertarian arguments do
little to explain a Free Speech Principle that protects other-regarding
conduct" (p. 11 ). The fact that speech is not "necessarily ineffectual"
or may be capable "of causing unpleasant consequences" does not
necessarily suggest that "we must look elsewhere" for justifications
(p. 11 ). Rather we must estimate and compare the magnitude of the
effects of speech as opposed to other forms of action.
Suppose, for example, that advocating disobedience of the law
were shown to have less of an impact on society than the actual acts
of disobedience themselves. While the acts and the expression are
both other-regarding, one might plausibly urge that the speech is less
likely to cause harm than the illegal acts. 13 Such an argument would
raise substantial problems as to what counts as evidence and who
would make the necessary determinations. But, if we may suspend
disbelief for a moment, assume that this is the case. From this premise, a polity might create a strong presumption in favor of free expression, one that could only be rebutted by a strong showing of the
actuality or likelihood of harm. In the case of acts, however, there
might be a strong contrary presumption: the acts themselves are
overwhelmingly likely to cause the anticipated harms. The otherregarding nature of speech may demonstrate that speech is not necessarily harmless, but it does not demonstrate that expression and
conduct need to be treated identically under libertarian principles.
Apart from omitting consideration of the magnitude of harm,
Schauer's analysis is problematic on the subject of causation. The
fact that speech can have a particular effect does not mean that it
will. Recall Justice Holmes's characterization of the facts in Abrams
v. United States14 as "the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by
an unknown man." When a speaker urges a crowd to assault a public official, there are many questions that need to be asked about the
actual or potential harm. Was the source of the message sufficiently
legitimate and respected that the crowd would (or did) respond to
the speaker? Were there conflicting messages at roughly the same
time? Was the crowd already intent on violence or did the speaker
incite the crowd to acts that it would not otherwise commit? Was the
crowd attentive? Did it hear the message? Did the crowd have the
present capacity to commit the crime? Was there time to deliberate
and consider the message? These questions raise extremely difficult
issues of causation, and a legal system might well prefer per se rules
12. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT
PRESSION IN AMERICA 263-80 (1983).
13. See Redish, supra note 7, at 601.
14. 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

EX-
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to a case-by-case evaluation of all of these factors. Time and complexity are the stuff of decisional paralysis, not judicial consecration
of winners and losers. But the link between other-regarding speech
and harm is not nearly as secure as Schauer appears to indicate.
And if causation in relation to words is more difficult to ascertain
than in relation to actions and if speech advances vital interests not
advanced by conduct, the distinction might well support a principle
that presumptively protects speech.
Schauer's treatment of causation is all the more mystifying because, in other sections of Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, he
is quite skeptical of causal relationships. For example, he argues
that "without casual link between free speech and increased knowledge the argument from truth must fail" (p. 19). To the question,
"does knowledge triumph over ignorance" (p. 25), Schauer responds
with the obvious answer. Sometimes untruths are quite attractive.
"[T]he belief that truth will prevail when matched against falsehood" cannot be demonstrated empirically, for people are not necessarily as rational as the argument from truth assumes (p. 26). So
too, while one's dignity may be affronted by restrictions on otherregarding speech, it may also be affronted by the regulation of otherregarding conduct (p. 64). But without a demonstration that the regulation of other-regarding speech causes more harm to one's dignity
than the regulation of other-regarding conduct, defenders of freedom of expression are back in the old bind: they must defend a thoroughgoing libertarianism, a minimal state, if they are to defend free
speech.
Why is it that Schauer subjects the purported benefits of free expression to the most exacting causal analysis, but subjects the supposed harms to only the most casual analysis? If there are
counterexamples to the benefits of expression - situations where
unregulated speech does not lead to truth, dignity, self-fulfillment,
and democratic governance - are there not also counterexamples to
the harms - situations where false speech does not harm reputations
or where advocacy of illegal acts does not cause the commission of
crimes? Schauer's approach would be more useful if he employed
the same model of causation in assessing both benefits and harms.
And even then, depending on the probabilities and the magnitude of
effects, a polity might still decide to adopt a presumption in favor of
all or particular types of expression.

II
Schauer's teleological framework for probing the rationales for
freedom of speech indicates his dedication to consequentialist or
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utilitarian approaches. Is His philosophical enquiry not only frees
him of the constraints of positive law, it also allows him to consider
broadly the consequences of various free speech principles. In a revealing footnote, he states that he uses
'utility' and 'utilitarian' in somewhat non-technical senses, to refer to
practicality, or usefulness, or pragmatic considerations in general. I do
not here equate utilitarian considerations with appeals solely to happiness or pleasure. Perhaps "consequentialism" might be a better word
. . ., but I want to stress the difference between . . . practical considerations . . . and the more theoretical consequentialist arguments . . . .
[P. 213, n.l].

But all of Schauer's consequentialism is of the theoretical rather than
the practical variety; The book contains not a single reference to,
much less discussion of, empirical studies of the questions he examines. This is so despite his mournful complaint that "the arguments
cry out for empirical support," but regrettably "the [necessary] empirical research to support or refute these arguments has not been
undertaken in a systematic way" (p. 73). His empiricism is one of
imagination and experience, not one of data bases and carefully controlled social science surveys or experiments.
I do not depreciate the role of experience, history, and intuition
in assessing the consequences of free speech principles. Quite to the
contrary, I have argued elsewhere that such analyses are appropriate. I6 But Schauer appears to have a faith in empirical evidence that
cannot be justified in the light of the existing state of social science
research. I 7 If he had perused the vast communications literature, he
would have discovered that there is very little in the way of "hard
empirical support" (p. 82) for virtually any proposition vital to the
analysis of freedom of expression. Is This is particularly true of mass
communications, given the pre-existing attitudes of audiences, the
stubbornness of individuals, the opportunities to tune out messages,
the characteristics of the speaker, and the multiplicity of variables
that potentially influence people. I 9 Terms that lawyers and philosophers toss about with ease - like incitement, advocacy, captive
audiences, and propaganda20 - do not find easy empirical counter15. See generally Lichtenberg, Book Review, 92 YALE L.J. 544 (1983) (discussing consequentialist theory).
16. See M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 89. See generally Yudof, School JJesegregalion: Legal
Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS,, Autumn 1978, at 68-77.
17. See M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 71-89; see also Yudof, supra note 16, at 68-77.
18. Despite its notoriety, even studies of the effects of televised violence are inconclusive.
See Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: Firs/ Amendment Principles and Social Science
Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1134-70 (1978).
19. See M. YUDOF, supra note 12, at 71-89; see also J. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF MASS
COMMUNICATIONS (1960).
20. See generally Y. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 125-27 (1951).
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parts in the communications literature.
The null hypothesis is dominant in the communication literature.21 It is not so much that researchers believe that communications have no effects; rather, they find it extremely difficult to isolate
those effects.22 The null hypothesis is presently confronted, alas, by
a revitalized school of critical theory, a school that emphasizes that
"[t]he communication channels and messages are as much a part of
the structure of domination as are the military forces and the strictures of the international banking system."23 Despairing of isolating
causes and effects, these critical theorists abandon this frustrating
subject and emphasize the "social role" of communications "in
maintaining, enhancing, or disrupting . . . the existing interrelationships of politics, economics, and culture."24 Rhetoric now substitutes
for theory and empirical research. 25
But the news for Professor Schauer may be even worse. Not only
is the ship of empiricism still at sea; he may be waiting in the wrong
port. 26 Many of the questions he asks about self-expression, dignity,
and truth may never be subject to even crude measurement, as they
embody long-range empirical and normative judgments. What
counts as progress toward higher levels of knowledge and dignity,
for example, may be more a function of normative political and
moral judgments than of any empirical calculus. And even if measurements were possible, a decision as to how much harm to tolerate
from free speech in return for an ascertainable quantum of benefit
may itself be a normative judgment. Schauer has not quite made
good on his assertion in the preface that "conceptual analysis is more
prominent in this book than normative argument" (p. ix). He implies as much in his "Explication" section, in an analogy to the criminal justice system that is many pages and concepts removed from
his articulation of first principles (chapter 9).
21. See Schramm, Nature of Communication Between Humans, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 7 (W. Schramm & D. Roberts eds. 1971).
22. As I said on another occasion:
The communications literature . . • suggests that messages are more likely to be persuasive if they reinforce existing attitudes, or if they build incrementally on those attitudes. If
the messages are addressed to a mass audience, common sense suggests that an appeal to
widely-shared cultural, social, and political values is the key to success. Virtually by definition, such consensual values are likely to be embraced by a large number of mass communicators. If this is the case, the efficacy of the entire system of communications may be
quite high even though empiricists cannot connect particular communicators or messages
with specific effects.
M. YUDOF, supra note 12, at 84-85.
23. Schiller, Critical Research in the Information Age, 33 J. OF COMMUNICATION, Summer
1983, at 249, 250.
24. Slack & Allor, The Political and Epistemological Constituents of Critical Communication
Research, 33 J. OF COMMUNICATION, Summer 1983, at 208, 214.
25. See generally Levinson, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466, 1484-86 (1983).
26. See generally C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1979).
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Schauer paraphrases Blackstone's maxim "that it is better that
ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man be punished" (p.
136). This assumes, of course, that mistakes in the administration of
laws are inevitable. But Blackstone's balancing of the harms and
benefits of the criminal process affirms "the belief that the erroneous
deprivation of individual liberty is far more serious than the erroneous release of one who is in fact guilty" (p. 137). This belief, however, is rooted in a value judgment and not in empirical analysis.
The empirical data, optimally, may inform decisionmakers about the
costs of a system - the number of guilty persons set free, the
number of innocent persons who are punished - and costs may influence decisions about the nature of the system. Commitment to a
norm may be strained or reinforced as costs are identified and measured. But empirical evidence alone cannot settle the question of the
rightness of the norm. 21
Consequences are irrelevant only to the mentally infirm and to
neo-Kantians and others who have glimpsed the New Jerusalem. 28
As R.M. Hare has said, "a complete moral system will depend both
on logical and on empirical theses - which makes it all the more
important to be clear which are which." 29 This is true of principles of
free speech. If the issue is whether to tolerate injuries to reputation
in order to protect speech that is thought to advance democratic values, facts alone will not settle the matter. Empirical studies cannot
tell us how much benefit from free expression is enough, or how
much harm is too much. At best, they can tell us only the price of
our moral and political commitments. The key is to distinguish
moral thinking from "facts about the way things and people are, in
the world as it is."30
One final point on this matter. Moral principles that are only
presumptive in character may yield political principles that are absolute. Moral arguments over whether free speech yields increased
knowledge or strengthens democracy may be close, and the consequences may vary depending on the context and circumstances. But
if political principles, in a sense, are applied moral principles, and if
political principles are fashioned and applied by imperfect human
beings and institutions, it may be preferable to have per se rules that
circumscribe the range of discretionary judgments. Professor
Schauer recognizes the imperfections of decisionmaking in the real
world, but declines to contemplate the possiblity of absolute rules.
27. See Yudof, supra note 16, at 73-75.
28. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971) ("All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be
irrational, crazy.").
29. R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 5 (1981) (reviewed in this issue). See generally Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991 (1977).
30. R.M. HARE, supra note 29, at 5.
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He notes that "in applying the law of defamation, it is necessary to
recognize that judicial determination of truth or falsity may occasionally be in error'' (p. 170):
Because of these uncertainties and risks in the process of ascertaining
truth, a rule penalizing falsity has the actual effect of introducing some
self-censorship as to statements that are in fact true. [P. 171, emphasis
in original].

But instead of discussing the pros and cons of absolute rules, he argues that "[t]he problem is inevitably one of balancing interests":
Given the value of the circulation of accurate information, and given
the harm of defamatory falsehood, no solution at either extreme seems
tenable. [P. 171].

An extreme solution, however, may be tenable, not as a matter of
moral principle, but as a recognition of the fragility of human institutions applying such a principle. This is a variant of the argument
from uncertainty, the uncertainty over whether institutions will reflect our principles in their decisions. For example, depending on its
preferences for protecting reputations or enhancing self-governance,
a polity might choose to treat defamation of public officials precisely
like any other case of defamation, or it might create a rule that public officials may never recover damages for defamatory statements
relating to their fitness for public service or the discharge of their
duties. Moral ambiguity need not necessarily be translated into political ambiguity.
III
Professor Schauer's discussion of the competing candidates for a
free speech principle (pp. 15-86) is provocative and interesting. In
analyzing the argument from truth, the theory that "truth will most
likely surface when all opinions may freely be expressed" (p. 16), he
notes the circularity of many forms of the argument. If truth is not
independently defined, and if it refers only to those propositions that
are widely accepted (the "consensus" or "survival" theory of
truth),31 then the truth theory reduces itself to a preference for "a
process of open discussion" over other methods of decisionmaking
- (p. 20). But in the absence of "independent criteria for truth," 32 the
31. See generally Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND.

L.J. l (1971).
32. See, e.g., Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
157, 160 (1980). Professor Chevigny, while rejecting the justification from truth for free
speech, makes the interesting argument that free speech is necessary to give propositions
meaning, and the
loss of meaning is objectionable for any person or government that purports to act purposively. . . . If the lesson drawn from the philosophy oflanguage is correct, that the meaning of statements within a system depends on formulating other aspects of the system
through dialogue, then every theory must allow for dialogue concerning its supporting
propositions. In other words, once a theory asserts that it means something, dialogue is

690

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 82:680

theory does not tell us why we should prefer open discussion "to any
other process, such as random selection or authoritarian fiat" (p. 20).
If majority rule and open discussion are favored processes, then the
real preference is for democratic norms over other forms of governance, not objective truth over falsity. (pp. 34, 39).
Schauer also effectively argues that "the argument from truth
may easily be characterized as an argument from uncertainty" (p.
31). Uncertainty is epistemologically important because "the validity of the argument varies in direct proportion to the degree of uncertainty inherent in the category of proposition involved" (p. 30). The
more uncertain the truth, the more value there may be to open discussion. The argument from truth may be primarily rooted in a concern for aesthetic, ethical, political, and religious expression,
categories of speech that are not likely to command a ready consensus (p. 31 ). We may be more certain of truths in mathematics or
science, and hence be less certain an airing of contrary views will
lead to the discovery of new truths and knowledge. Stated differently, there may be more concern over the impact of speech regulations in some contexts than in others.
As Schauer recognizes, even the most established of scientific
theories is subject to revision in the light of new evidence. There are
only degrees of certainty and consistency, even in mathematics. 33
But I was struck by the value of Schauer's insights in relation to
current disputes over indoctrination in public schools.34 It appears
to be one thing for school authorities to embrace established scientific truths, to the exclusion of less accepted scientific theories, 35 and
quite another for them to espouse political truths to the exclusion of
alternative visions of politics. 36 The former is likely to be treated as
necessary to establish that meaning. It follows that any political theory that denies a right
of free discourse is internally contradictory since it condemns itself to a loss of meaning.
Id at 162. Compare id with Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid JJown: A Critique ofInlerpreliV•
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 785 (1983) ("[T]he only coherent basis for
the requisite continuities of history and meaning is found in the communitarian assumptions
of conseivative social thought . . . ."); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373,
377 (1982) ("[M]uch contemporary writing . . . is explicitly self-referential in its demand that
the reader . . . confront the extent to which language and image are unavoidably ambiguous,
and its assertion that any given . . . meaning is the product of an interchange between object
and viewer rather than an attribute of the object itself.").
33. See the discussion of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem in D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL,
EscHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 24 (1979) ("[N]o axiomatic system whatsoever
could produce all number-theoretical truths, unless it were an inconsistent system.").
34. See generally S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOL•
ING (1983) (reviewed in this issue); Yudof, The Stale as Editor or Censor: Book Selection and
the Public Schools, in OFFICE FOR INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, AM. LIBRARY ASSN., CENSOR•
SHIP LITIGATION AND THE SCHOOLS 49 (1983); Harpaz,A Paradigm ofFirs/ Amendment Dilemmas: Resolving Public School Library Censorship Disputes, 4 W. NEW ENG, L. REV, I (1981).
35. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). See generally CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE (M. La Follette ed. 1983).
36. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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involving the selectivity inherent in any educational process, while
the latter is likely to be treated as a "pale of orthodoxy" or ideological censorship.37 The distinction also parallels the differentiation of
skill training and the inculcation of attitudes or moral values. 38 But
before taking the uncertainty principle too seriously, perhaps one
should recall Bertrand Russell's admonition about the truths of
science:
Consider what we do to our children. We do not say to them: "Some
people think the earth is round, and others think it flat; when you grow
up, you can, if you like, examine the evidence and form your own conclusion." Instead of this we say: "The earth is round." By the time
our children are old enough to examine the evidence, our propaganda
has closed their minds, and the most persuasive arguments of the Flat
Earth Society make no impression.39
The chapters on the arguments from self-expression, self-realization, and dignity4° make vitally important points about the relationship of freedom of expression to a thoroughgoing nineteenth-century
liberalism. As Schauer notes, happiness and self-realization of the
individual may be important values, but what basis is there for distinguishing among types of freedoms that advance those values?
Many people indeed believe that freedom to express their opinions is a
primary component of their happiness. But others are as likely to be
satisfied with other freedoms, or prefer the security or intellectual anaesthesia that accompanies rigid controls on expression. [P. 49].
Our physical well-being, our non-intellectual pleasures, our need for
food and shelter, and our desire for security are also important, although these are wants that we share with the rest of the animal world.
Because any governmental or private action to restrict communication
is usually justified in the name of one of these or other similar wants
. . ., a particular protection of communication under this version of a
natural rights theory must assume that communication is prima facie
more important than these other interests. [P. 55].
Either we must admit that there is nothing special about self-fulfillment through expression, that free-speech stands on the same plane
as other wants and needs (p. 56), or we must construct a normative
theory based "not so much on what man is as on what man ought to
be" (p. 49). If the self-fulfillment argument is to distinguish the sat37. See Pico, 451 U.S. at 853. See generally Stem, Challenging Ideological Exclusion ef
Curriculum Material· Rights ef Students and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 485 (1979).
38. See Katz, 17ze Present Moment in Educational Reform, 41 HARV. Eouc. REv. 342, 355
(1971).
39. B. RUSSELL, POWER 268-69 (1938).
40. See generally Baker, Scope ef the First Amendment Freedom ef Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964 (1978); Redish, supra note 7. Even the proponents of self-realization theories do not
agree on their meaning and application. See Baker, Realizing Se!f-Realization: Corporate
Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646 (1982);
Redish, Se!f-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom efExpression: A Reply to Professor Baker,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Redish, Reply].
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isfaction and happiness of purchasing a home from that of writing a
book, it must call upon a normative vision of liberty or an empirical
distinction between the self-realization effects of speech and
conduct.41
The power of Professor Schauer's analysis of self-realization may
be demonstrated by consideration of Professor C. Edwin Baker's approach to the constitutionality of government regulation of commercial speech.42 For Baker, "a complete denial of first amendment
protection for commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is
required by, first amendment theory."43 Why is this? Because protected speech exists "as a manifestation of the self, and the selfs
choices and commitments . . . . As long as speech represents the
freely-chosen expression of the speaker while depending for its
power on the free acceptance of the listener, freedom of speech represents a charter of liberty for noncoercive action . . . ."44 But is
not speech in the marketplace a "freely-chosen expression of the
speaker?" A reflection of self?45 For Baker, the question raises concerns about false consciousness. In his view, the market creates the
demands that it satisfies, and besides, "[h]ow 'profit' wants the world
to be bears no necessary relation to how any individual wants it to
be. To allow 'profit' to vote is to depreciate human freedom." 46 In
short, commercial speech does not advance the self-realization objective of freedom of expression.
But how does Professor Baker know these things? Do not
Madison Avenue artists and writers derive- satisfaction from creating
and distributing Coca-Cola advertisements? What of the vacuum
cleaner salesperson who has the opportunity to deliver his entire talk
on the glories of his product? Might not the choice of jobs reflect the
satisfaction of speaking on the job as well as wages or profits? An
anthropomorphic conception of "profit" will not do either. If the
norms of profit maximization in corporations constrain the individual's range of choices over expression, this is also true of the articles
41. See, e.g., Redish, Reply, supra note 40, at 684. See generally A. MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE (1981). Professor Redish also espouses a positivist justification for limiting the selfrealization rationale to freedom of speech. Redish, Reply, supra, at 684.
42. Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. Rev. 1
(1976).
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 7 (emphasis deleted).
45. See Redish,Reply,supra note 40, at 686 ("Equally damaging to Baker's [theory] •.. is
. . . the impossibility of separating the profit orientation from the goal of self-realization,")
(footnote omitted).
46. Baker, supra note 42, at 15-16. This view of the profit motive and self-realization leads
to the supposition that corporations do not have free speech rights. See Baker, supra note 40,
at 652, 677; Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 253 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (reviewed in this issue). See generally Powe, Mass Speech
and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. Rev. 243, 254-60; Levinson, supra note 25, at
1478-80.
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of a newspaper reporter working for The Washington Post. 47 It is
certainly true of lawyers soliciting clients,48 or textbook writers and
publishers seeking to nail down sales in the Texas and California
public school markets. 49
And from the perspective of the listener, 50 how does one know
that the capitalists have created wants and needs that would not
otherwise exist? Do Polish and Chinese people, in the absence of
mass advertising, decline to press for consumer goods like television
sets and automobiles? Do not producers often satisfy real wants and
needs, though they seek to induce consumers to buy their products
and not the products of others? Is there not a mutually affecting relationship between consumer needs and producer advertising? The
fact that mass advertising and hedonistic consumers coexist in a culture does not necessarily imply that the former caused the latter. In
yielding to a simplistic etiology, Baker ignores a primal truth about
cultures: they are culturally biased.
The concept of false consciousness51 is pivotal to Professor
Baker's self-realization principle for free speech, allowing him to reject arguments for protecting commercial speech. But how do we
identify true and false expressions of preferences? Who is in charge
of deciding such questions? 52 If a person has been indoctrinated to
enjoy chocolate ice cream, and Professor Baker believes that rightthinking persons would prefer vanilla ice cream, does it follow that
the deviant gourmand does not experience happiness upon eating
chocolate? Would revelation and rumination cause the person to
embrace vanilla? 53 Should we assume that the preference for chocolate was coerced by family, peers, mass media, state, and Baskin
Robbins? 54
41. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 1479.
48. For cases involving solicitation, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447
(1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
49. See generally F. FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED (1979).
50. This perspective is rejected by Professor Baker. See Redish, Reply, supra note 40, at
686.
51. See generally R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY (1981).
52. As Professor Redish has stated:
Baker's fallacy on this point is his assumption that the value of self-rule is limited to
whatever he would label "rational, intelligent self-rule." But such a limitation would totally undermine the concept, for to allow individuals to choose only what some external
force determines is "rational" and "intelligent" is effectively to deprive them of self-rule.
Redish, Reply, supra note 40, at 685 (citing Redish, supra note 7, at 618-19).
53. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 525-26 (popcorn).
54. One approach to the dilemma of false and true wants and needs is identified by Raymond Geuss as arising from the writings of critical theorists:
[W]e may call a belief "reflectively unacceptable" to a group of agents if they would give
it up, were they to reflect on it in the light of information about the conditions under
which they could have acquired it . . . . Legitimizing beliefs are acceptable only if they
could have been acquired by the agents in a free and uncoerced discussion in which all
members of the society take part.
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Further, as critical theorists 55 and others56 have noted, false consciousness is also a problem in politics. Governments engage in
massive communications activities, including public schooling, publication of pamphlets and books, maintenance of libraries, and advertising, and these efforts raise significant issues of indoctrination to
government-embraced values. 57 Such indoctrination, potentially,
may constrain the political speech of individuals. If an orientation
towards profits reflects a false consciousness, so too might expressions in favor of voting rights and racial equality.
As Schauer suggests, the logic of the argument from self-realization, in the absence of normative theory of rights, will not yield an
intelligible distinction between freedom of speech and a general theory of libertarianism. In the guise of distinguishing true wants from
false ones, Baker has drawn an unjustifiable distinction between
commercial and other forms of speech. To the extent that Professor
Baker is displeased with capitalist men and women, he should be
fashioning and defending a normative theory of the good life and a
vision of the men and women who would inhabit that world.58 Free
speech may be essential to that epistemological process. Alternatively, he might espouse a broader theory of liberty, one that covers
both political and commercial speech.59
Schauer is equally adept in his treatment of the argument from
dignity, the notion that "when the state suppresses ... [a] person's
expression of . . . ideas, the state is insulting that person and affronting his dignity" (p. 62). The core difficulty, once again, is that
dignity supports a global argument for liberty, "not an argument for
a special liberty of speech" (p. 65):
R. GEuss, supra note 51, at 62 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also B. ACKER·
MAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139-67, 180-86, 352-55 (1980). One should not
lightly assume, however, that all beliefs contrary to those of a critical theorist have been acquired through coercion, nor that that awareness of the coercion would necessarily cause a
person to change his or her beliefs. Further, the identification of what is coercion may itself be
influenced by "ideology," as is clearly indicated by the writings of the critical theorists. And in
a specific cultural context, the projection of true beliefs may be far more speculative and normative than empirical.
With all these difficulties, the reader may wonder why critical theorists remain so infatuated with the hermeneutic concept of "false consciousness." The answer lies in the disappointed expectations of would-be revolutionaries. See I. BALDUS, MARXISM AND
DOMINATION 55-56 (1982) (concept of false consciousness arises out of the Marxist's need to
explain the anomaly that "the consciousness and practice of the Western industrial working
class has been directed toward the amelioration of its level of consumption rather than the
transformation of its mode of production.").
55. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.
205 (1979). See generally R. GEuss, supra note 5 l.
56. See, e.g., M. YUDOF, supra note 12; Shiffrin, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1982).
57. See generally M. YuooF, supra note 12.
58. See generally A. MAclNTYRE, supra note 41.
59. See Coase, supra note 3, at 389.
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[W]hen words are other-regarding, whatever the precise definition of
that term, the ideas of dignity and insult are no more dispositive than
they would be if someone claimed his dignity to be insulted by restrictions on his freedom to pollute the atmosphere, commit assault, play
the saxophone in church, or practice cardio-vascular surgery without a
medical degree or licence. [P. 64].

My impression is that people gain dignity from adequate incomes,
interesting jobs, meals on the table, shelter, and economically independent children. If dignity is the linchpin, and if the argument is
that dignity in the sphere of ideas is somehow different from that in
the economic sphere, the proponent of the distinction "has no arrows
left in his quiver if and when his arguments for this broad Millian
freedom are rejected" (p. 65).60 If the argument is that personal dignity requires equal respect for individuals in political processes, in
the public sphere, then the dignity argument merges with the normative argument from democracy.
Schauer's treatment of the justification from personal autonomy
is similar to that for self-fulfillment and dignity (pp. 67-72).61 In the
absence of a demonstration that repression of speech is more harmful to personal autonomy than regulation of conduct, devotees of
freedom of expression should join the ranks of laissez-faire capital.;.
ists. If governmental paternalism is accepted in the sphere of conduct, for example compulsory education and consumer protection
laws, then the same types of justifications (avoidance of harms, affirmative liberty, transactional incapacities) ought to apply to paternalism in the realm of expression. Principles of free expression that
focus on the interests of the listeners frequently are rooted in traditional libertarian ideas, and are difficult to disentangle from general
theories of liberty generating visions of the minimally intrusive state.
Indeed, the leading proponent of the autonomy theory, Professor
Scanlon, recanted largely on this ground. 62 If autonomy is defined
in terms of the political process, then it draws its normative force
from its instrumental relationship to democratic values and not primarily from its intrinsic value to individuals.
60. Of course, one might argue that self-realization from economic gain is inherently limited by virtue of scarce resources, whereas free speech is not so limited by scarcity. But presumably those who own television and radio stations and newspapers may deploy their resources
for expression and thereby reach higher levels of self-realization than those who must rely
upon face-to-face communication. Thus, the self-realization argument might well support access to newspapers and cable television channels, campaign financing laws, and other efforts to
secure equality among speakers. See generally Barron, Access to the Press - A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the
Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975).
61. See generally Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, l PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 204
(1972).
62. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 532.
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IV

The most perplexing aspect of the book is Professor Schauer's
reliance on an analytical method in the chapters on theory and his
tacit rejection of that method in the chapters on applications.
Schauer treats the various theoretical justifications for free speech
largely in isolation from each other, and he rejects principles if they
are not self-sufficient. This approach is rhetorically effective, as when
he keenly demonstrates, for example, that self-realization or the advancement of truth, standing alone, will not support a free speech
principle. Conceptual flaws are largely demonstrated through
counterexamples. In this fashion, the theoretical chapters are responsive to the rhetorical excesses of the philosophers of free speech
who seek a general theory that draws on a single and coherent perspective - the one right theory that excludes all other justifications
from its domain. Recall John Milton's unbridled reconstruction of
human experience: "Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" 63
But Professor Schauer's rhetorical style, while responsive to the
perfectionism of other theorists, makes it appear that he too is a
perfectionist, that if his fertile mind can conjure up one counterexample, a theory has been devastated. Yet, in the last part of the
book, the author is far more practical and realistic, eschewing perfect
conceptual arguments for the inevitable adjustment of conflicting
principles in the flawed world in which we live. Thus, it is as if there
are two Frederick Schauers. One is "eclectic"64 about free speech
theories and recognizes the limits of philosophical arguments. The
other appears to be a perfectionist, adopting a reactive analytical
style that belies that eclecticism. The two perspectives simply coexist
in Free Speech and are never explicitly linked to each other.
The tendency to rebut through counterexamples, the pink snake
style of argument, is disturbing. If X is a justification for Y, a free
speech principle, and if X is not always true, then it follows that Y is
not defensible. If a theorist imaginatively identifies a single counterexample, no matter how unlikely, the theory is discarded. One pink
snake and the terrain is uninhabitable. In his chapters on principles,
Professor Schauer sometimes succumbs to this "it ain't necessarily
so" refrain. Let me give an example. To the proposition that free
speech advances the search for truth, he responds that "it is simply a
mistake to say that the expression of false or unsound opinions can
never have unpleasant consequences" (p. 28). With respect to race
relations, "[h]istory has shown us that people unfortunately are
much more inclined to be persuaded of the rectitude of oppressing
63. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (Cambridge ed. 1918) (1st ed. 1644).
64. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 21 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980). See generally Shiffrin,
Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983).
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certain races . . than they are likely to accept other unsound and
no less palpably wrong views" (p. 28). So much for the truth. But
who asserts that "unsound opinions can never have unpleasant consequences?" If unsound opinions on race relations are harmful, does
it follow that the argument from truth has no weight? Are we not
worried about our uncertainty over what is true? Where are the sonar instruments that detect unsound views? How about the notion
that, on balance, truth is advanced by free speech?
Another example comes from the author's discussion of the argument from democracy. The argument, as Schauer frames it, is that
the citizenry should have access to information and opinions in order to exercise its political judgment and to exercise control over
those who govern them (pp. 38-39). This perspective is taken from
Meiklejohn's theory of freedom of expression and self-governing
speech,65 though Schauer, unlike Meiklejohn, perceives that both
speakers and listeners require protection under the democratic theory. It is also similar to Blasi's notion of free speech as a check on
government abuse of power66 and my own notion of the "self-controlled" citizen.67 Schauer has many interesting things to say about
this rationale,68 but he considers the "paradox of power" (p. 40) to
be dispositive:
If the people collectively are in fact the sovereign, and if that sovereign
has the unlimited powers normally associated with sovereignty, _then
acceptance of this view of democracy compels acceptance of the power
of the sovereign to restrict the liberty of speech just as that sovereign
may restrict any other liberty.
. . . [A] Free Speech Principle exists only ifit is an exception to the
general rule of majority sovereignty; only if it is a right, of indeterminate strength, against the majority. Any distinct restraint on majority
power, such as a principle of freedom of speech, is by its nature antidemocratic, anti-majoritarian. [P. 40].

Thus, an argument for freedom of expression based on democratic
premises is a contradiction.
As Schauer admits, his "argument may prove too much"; much
lurks in the "sterile notion of democracy as majority rule" (p. 41).
But because a democracy might choose not to remain a democracy,
and foreclose the process by which majorities are formed and expressed, he rejects the strong argument from democracy. This particular pink snake comes of the intoxications of philosophy. If
65. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
66. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 521; see also Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455 (1983).
61. See M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 20-37.
68. But see Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE LJ. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
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slavery is forbidden, may a man voluntarily sell himself into slavery?
If human life is protected, may a person commit suicide? But a

snake charmer can respond to the paradox of the suicidal urges of
democracy: the polity should hobble along with the free speech and
democracy until the Armageddon. Perhaps the majority can decide
to stamp out free speech and majoritarian politics, thereby insuring a
totalitarian future. That a democratic government will not necessarily protect freedom of expression does not mean that such freedom is
not a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for democracy.
Or perhaps democratic values include root notions of
countermajoritarian rights? 69 Or perhaps temporal majorities need
to be distinguished from constitutional majorities over time, thereby
legitimating a principle of paternalism to preserve democracy. 70 But
however these hypothetical traumas are to be met, why is the argument from democracy for freedom of expression defeated because
scholars can imagine situations in which our principles will turn
back on themselves? Is it not sufficient if the principle works tolerably well in the here and now?
Needless to say, the "falsification" turf is normally reserved for
philosophers, and I tread on it with some trepidation. Robert Paul
Wolff, for example, has contrasted the philosophical method of "formal logic, where a theorem is invalidated by a single counterexample, no matter how bizarre or peripheral," with an "opposed
conception of philosophy" that tests the power of the central insight
of a philosophical position.71 Wolff prefers the latter method,
though he does not reject the former. I agree. In the realm of applied moral principles, which I have described as political principles
to be applied by imperfect human beings and institutions, the
method of "formal logic" has its place; it reaffirms our commitment
to reason and our capacity for reflection. But formal logic is not allencompassing. History ·and human experience also provide guidance. If free speech meaningfully contributes to democracy, the
quest for truth, and human dignity, the existence of a few difficult
and atypical counterexamples, imaginatively conjured up, should
not be dispositive. Logic needs to be balanced against life, as imperfect people aim for principles that work tolerably well in an imperfect world. Virtually no practical principle of politics is immune to
the virus of the counterexample. At some point, the counterexamples may be so numerous and compelling as to cause the abandonment of the principle. They may even be confirmed by evolving
69. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
70. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26-28 (1962); J. BUCHANAN,
THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY 42-43, 93-98 (1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10
(1978).
71. R.P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 7 (1977).
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experience. But logical possibilities should be only a part of an overall calculus as to whether the normative and empirical game is worth
the candle.
Ironically, I have good reason to believe that Professor Schauer is
largely in agreement with me on the falsification debate. In an upcoming article, he examines and rejects "the argument from weird
cases" in responding to the hyperbole of the "deconstructionist"
movement in constitutional law. He rightly suggests that it is a "non
sequitur . .. [to] move from the proposition that language is imperfect to the proposition that language is useless." 72 So, too, of principles of free speech. Any principle or language employed to describe
legal norms will inevitably be unclear in some circumstances. But
there are core and fringe applications of rules and principles, and it
certainly does not follow that a difficult case or a wrong result at the
fringes necessarily means that the principle should be rejected. To
paraphrase Professor Schauer's remarks about language, if principles are neyer perfect but "cannot plausibly be claimed to be always
worthless, the argument from weird cases turns out to say al.most
nothing at all. " 73 If these views fail to emerge clearly from Free
Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, it is only because of the author's
compulsion to respond in kind to the rhetorical styles of free speech
theorists. When he turns to the application of free speech principles,
he is more modest about the possibilities of principled decisionmaking by human institutions.
V
The argument for freedom of expression that Schauer finds most
attractive appears in a chapter on "the utility of suppression" (p. 73).
He characterizes the other arguments for a free speech principle as
positive justifications, depending on the asserted benefits of UJlfegulated speech (p. 81 ). He proposes instead a negative theory of
expression:
Even if there is nothing especially good about speech compared to
other conduct, the state may have less ability to regulate speech than it
has to regulate other forms of conduct, or the attempt to regulate
speech may entail special harms or special dangers not present in regulation of other conduct.
. . . Experience arguably shows that governments are particularly
bad at censorship, that they are less capable of regulating speech than
they are of regulating other forms of conduct. [P. 81].
In probing the "deeper reason" for his intuition that government
cannot be trusted to regulate speech, Schauer perceives that regulatory authority is given to government officials who "have the most to
72. Schauer, Easy Cases (unpublished manuscript).

13. Id.
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lose from arguments against their authority" (p. 81 ). They may
abuse their authority over speech - for example, with respect to
treason and sedition - precisely because they have interests that diverge from the public interest in protecting the polity from harm:
Reasons of power, prestige, mission, or money inspire in people the
desire to attain government office, and those same reasons also inspire
in them the want to retain those positions.
. . . [A]ny system of regulating political speech puts in control
those with the most to lose from the activities they are regulating. [Pp.
81-82].

He concludes with the maxim that no person ought "to be judge of
his own cause" (p. 82).
The negative justification, or government incompetence argument, for free speech raises numerous difficulties. First, Schauer has
once again been inconsistent with regard to the need for empirical
proof and causal relationships to support a principle. For his own
vision of a free speech principle, he is in no mood to rearrange the
deck chairs on the Titanic. He admits that "[i]t is true that there is
no hard empirical support for the proposition that government officials are likely to be over-aggressive censors for reasons of self-interest" (p. 82). Yet he presses on. He argues that the "nature of the
relationship," and, I would add, history and experience, 'justifies the
assumption of bias" (p. 82). Further, he limits the incompetence argument in ways that are not intuitively (or empirically) obvious. For
example, consider the potential of government to employ its communications powers to engineer the consent of the citizenry; government officials have a built-in incentive to indoctrinate citizens to
norms that serve the interests of those in power.74 But here (p. 56)
and elsewhere75 Professor Schauer overlooks or rejects this logical
extension of the incompetence principle.
Second, he urges that the "slippery-slope" is more treacherous
for the regulation of speech than for the regulation of conduct (pp.
83-85). But it is far from clear that the administration of laws governing speech inherently requires a more refined micrurgy than laws
regulating action. The inability to convey precise meanings is inherent in law and language;76 the vagaries of "cruel and unusual punishments" do not appear to be of lower order than those for
incitement, advocacy, or pornography. Nor are the rules for conduct
necessarily more easily learnable by administrators than those for
speech regulations. Rules regulating conduct frequently call for dif14. See M. YunoF, supra note 12.
75. Schauer, Book Review, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 379-83 (1983) (reviewing M. YUDOF,
supra note 12).
16. See Levinson, supra note 32.

February 1984]

In Search of a Free Speech Principle

701

fl.cult assessments of motivation,77 as for example in racial discrimination and unfair labor practice suits. I suspect that the alleged
vagueness of rules governing speech, and judicial sensitivity to
vagueness in the sphere but not in others,78 reflect the greater likelihood of governmental abuse of its discretion79 and the abiding concern for the harms of censorship.
Third, the argument from governmental incompetence is unpersuasive in the absence of a positive justification for free speech. If
speech is not valued for advancing personal autonomy or truth, for
example, why should we be concerned that the government is biased? It is simply not responsive to say that "[t]he issue is not
whether totalitarian groups should be allowed to speak, but whether
anyone should have the power to decide which groups are totalitarian and which are not" (p. 62). He might equally say that the issue is
not whether racism should be allowed, but whether anyone should
have the power to decide what are unconstitutional racist practices.
There are many responsibilities entrusted to governments that they
do not discharge with great discernment. There is no particular reason to remove governmental authority from the free speech picture
unless the results of government's ineptitude cause special harms or
preclude the achievement of some particularly valued benefits. If
inefficiency and incompetence are the starting points, there might
well be animated public discussion of whether sedition acts, environmental protection regulations, or the postal service should be the first
to be struck with the libertarian axe.
VI

In the end, Professor Schauer falls victim to a philosophical
method that values analysis over synthesis. He razes the free speech
structure, examines the bricks one at a time, discards most, and then
has trouble rebuilding the edifice. A defense of a free speech principle, rooted in uncertainty and distrust of government, requires a holistic approach if it is to stand. But perhaps I have unfairly accused
Professor Schauer of not writing the book that I would have him
write. His goal may have been only to illuminate the principles of
free speech through "philosophical enquiry." That he chooses to
probe the underpinnings of traditional free speech principles instead
of synthesizing them into a more complex principle does not detract
from the many virtues of his enterprise. The destruction of the existing edifice may be a necessary precursor to the erection of a new
77.
69 (2d
78.
1980).
79.

See P. BREST & s. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 454ed. 1983).
See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 730-38 (5th ed.
See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraints, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 423-26 (1983).
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one. The trouble with this view of Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry is that Professor Schauer has greater ambitions for his work.
The book does not end on page 86 with his discussion of "The Free
Speech Principle"; rather he goes on to include sections on "Explication" and "Applications." The titles of these sections suggest that
there is a principle to explicate and apply, that something has risen
from the ashes of his philosophical enquiry. But this principle never
clearly emerges except in relation to his negative arguments for free
speech. On the other hand, the careful examination of hard cases in
the second half of the book and the unwillingness to embrace a dogmatic vision of free speech evidences an openness to integrative theories. But, by and large, these integrative possibilities remain
inchoate in the larger work. Schauer fails to acknowledge openly
that a powerful justification for a free speech principle requires him
to connect the arguments from uncertainty, government incompetence, and democracy. Those arguments together operate to create a
rationale that is stronger than any one argument standing alone.
The critical insight is that freedom of expression is an epistemological process for determining what the majority wants. It is not
only, or even primarily, rooted in the need to protect minorities from
the overreaching of majorities in democratic polities. In the absence
of verifiable criteria for determining majority sentiment, expression,
like voting and lobbying, is an imperfect technique by which preferences are formed, articulated, and aggregated. It is both a method of
directly influencing government and a means of bolstering other
mechanisms of governmental accountability. In other words, free
speech is not only an instrumental principle in relation to other democratic constraints on government; it is itself a constraint. And these
constraints are mutually affecting, with the entire panoply of constraints yielding a process that aspires to majority decision.making.
"Majority rule" is indeed a "sterile" concept without such a
qualification.
Government officials, through communications efforts and otherwise, have the self-interest and capacity to falsify consent, to manipulate the same public opinion from which they gain their authority.
And even where self-controlled citizens, speaking and acting autonomously in matters of governance, are not overwhelmed by government communication, there will always be uncertainty as to whether
the majority endorses a particular policy outcome. 80 Many citizens
do not participate in voting, lobbying, and similar activities; 81 many
are irrational and acquiescent (pp. 26-27); voters elect officeholders
on the basis of many characteristics, not necessarily because their
views overlap on all or most policy issues; legislative processes may
80. The discussion in the text is largely taken from M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 152-57.
81. See generally R. WOLFINGER & s. RosENSTONE, WHO VOTES? (1980).
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thwart majority will; and the Arrow Theorem tells us that the ordering of the legislative agenda may determine policy outcomes. 82
When some initiative is taken on behalf of the "majority," we can
never be entirely sure that it is the majority and not just a self-interested government that is acting. Under such conditions of uncertainty, freedom of expression is the means by which we verify and
affirm majoritarian processes of governance. 8 3
Schauer's conditions for an argument from democracy are so
stringent as to preclude synthesis of free speech principles (pp. 4044). When he speaks of a "paradox of power," 84 he assumes that he
can ascertain that a majority opposes free speech (p. 40). But how
does he know this? All that he can say with certainty is that a government, purporting to represent the majority, has declined to protect speech. He assumes that democracy is dependent on "equal
participation in government," "equal competence and universal rationality" (p. 41 ). Otherwise, the people are not "sovereign." But
such strong forms of the argument doom it to empirical collapse.
Obviously, people are not equal participants, they are not equally
capable, and they certainly are not uniformly rational. But even imperfect citizens can affect their leaders. Charles Frankel comes much
closer to the mark in his more modest aims for a democracy:
"Government by consent" cannot be interpreted to mean that those
who are governed necessarily agree with what their rulers decide to do.
Nor can it mean that "the majority" agrees . . . .
But to speak of majorities and minorities and the inevitability of
disagreements is to suggest what "government by consent" expresses.
It expresses the hope for a society in which ordinary people can influence the actions their leaders take. This means they can exercise some
control over who their leaders will be. And it also means that they are
required to obey only after having been actively consulted by those
who issue the orders.85

The point is that freedom of expression refers to the process by
which the citizenry seeks to influence government. In the last analysis, as I have previously written, "[m]ajority rule in a democratic
society is not a simple substantive concept; it is a complex process of
consultation in which citizens are free to make up their minds and
express their opinions." 86 Thus the principle of uncertainty combines with the argument from democracy; for freedom of speech is
82. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963); Levine & Plott,
Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561 (1977).
83. M. YuooF, supra note 12, at ch. 10.
84. See also Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 451-52
(1983).
85. C. FRANKEL, THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 34 (1962), quoted and discussed in M.
YuooF, supra note 12, at 153-57.
86. M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 153.
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an indispensable means of verifying that the majority has the opportunity to influence policy.
In fairness to Professor Schauer, he comes quite close to this conclusion without explicitly recognizing the synergistic relationship of
uncertainty, governmental bias and incompetence, and democracy:
As our leaders become elected rulers rather than servants, governmental superstructures are more likely to become as concerned with perpetuation of their own power as with acting in what they perceive to be
the public interest . . . . [T]he same motivations that lead people to
aspire to governmental office also lead those people to want to retain
those positions. Freedom to criticize the government is a check on the
survival instincts of self-perpetuating governmental organizations. [P.
43].

Schauer thus builds on the impressive conceptual contributions of
Professor Blasi.87 But he fails to note that the problem is not simply
one of the ill-will of government officers; it is also a problem of the
uncertainty that surrounds any substantive concept of majority will
in a democracy.
This refined version of the argument from democracy also invokes the argument from autonomy. I take it that it is this interface
of principles that Professor Scanlon once recognized in saying "a legitimate government is one whose authority citizens can recognize
while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational
agents." 88 Citizens are not autonomous in the sense that they are
free from all or most of the constraints of culture or government.
Scanlon is not a proselyte of the minimal state or an apologist for
libertarianism. 89 Citizens should be autonomous in relation to governing processes:
[T]he argument for the Millian Principle rests on a limitation of the
authority of states to command their subjects rather than on a right of
individuals . . . . There are surely cases in which individuals have the
right not to have their acts of expression interfered with by other individuals, but these rights presumably flow from a general right to be
free from arbitrary interference . . . .90
So too, equality need not be invoked in the _broadest sense of
persons being equal in their intellects, tastes, resources, achievements, and income. In the speech context, equality of treatment in
the public sphere may suffice. As Michael Walzer has stressed:
Politics is always the most direct path to dominance, and political
power ... is probably the most important, and certainly the most dangerous, good in human history . . . .
87. Blasi, supra note 66.
88. Scanlon, supra note 61, at 214. I use the past tense in the text deliberately. See Scanlon, supra note 11.
89. See Scanlon, supra note 1I.
90. See Scanlon, supra note 61, at 221.
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One way of limiting political power is to distribute it widely. This
may not work, given the well-canvassed dangers of majority tyranny;
but these dangers are probably less acute than they are often made out
to be.91

In the artificially constructed world of democratic politics, persons are to be treated as equal, autonomous, and rational, whatever
their actual characteristics. In this sense, their human worth is affirmed. Such treatment leads to the recognition of a free speech
principle, a principle that verifies majority rule and protects the
processes of citizen influence over government. It is adherence to
democratic norms that de.fines the treatment of citizens, not the characteristics of actual citizens that suggest the democratic norms. 92
And adherence to those norms may affirm fundamental social and
intellectual values, thereby contributing to the development of a
"democratic personality" in citizens.93
To a re.fined argument from democracy, Professor Schauer responds that the resultant principle of free speech is too narrow. He is
unhappy because he "can make little sense of a notion of self-government in art, literature, or science" (p. 44). A satisfactory response, though a "Philistine and anti-cultural" one in some
quarters, 94 might well be that if the most compelling justification for
freedom of expression would not protect art, literature, and science,
then they should not be protected. If Schauer's approach is self-consciously conceptual and empirical, not intuitive, he is not compelled
to reject narrow, defensible principles. Indeed, in other parts of the
book, he does narrow the coverage. For example, his conclusion that
hard-core pornography is not protected speech - pornography is action because it provides sexual gratification akin to that associated
with prostitution and "vibrating sex aid[s]" (p. 181)95 -would benefit greatly from an infusion of the uncertainty, incompetence, and
democracy arguments. 96 The trouble is that, for all of Schauer's philosophizing, there is no clear and sustained relationship between his
articulation of principles in the first part of the book and his treatment of specific applications in the last part.
A holistic principle of free speech, which Schauer eschews, would
recognize that the arguments from democracy, individual autonomy,
91.
92.
93.
94.

M. WALZER, supra note 4, at 15 (footnote omitted).
But see Scanlon, supra note 11.
See Bollinger, supra note 84, at 458.
Beth, The Public's Right to Know: The Supreme Court As Pandora? (Book Review) 81
MICH. L. Rev. 880, 882 (1983); see also Scanlon, supra note 11; Chafee, Book Review, 62
HARV. L. Rev. 891 (1949).
95. I wonder if Professor Schauer would agree that governments ought to be able to ban
Shakespearean comedies on the theory that a feather, used to tickle the viewer, might achieve
the same response.
96. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 542-50.
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uncertainty, and governmental bias and incompetence are mutually
relating and affecting. 97 For example, in some instances we may not
view government decisionmaking as likely to be influenced by the
self-interest of government officials. This strikes me as particularly
important if we are discussing judgment distorting speech (pp. 30,
102), speech that "by-pass[es] our ability to consider . . . reasons." 98
If some forms of speech - for example, perjury, incitement, and
fraud - are likely to preclude deliberation by the listener and to
inflict great injury, that type of speech may be a good candidate for
regulation. 99 And in many circumstances, particularly with regard
to commercial speech, we may have less reason to believe that the
government will act in a self-interested and biased manner. Most
commercial speech is not a threat to those in power. The government is not so much worried that the speaker's views will gain adherents, as it is that the decisionmaking processes of listeners will be
distorted. 100
In other words, the application of the justification from bias and
incompetence often may lead in different directions in commercial
and political speech cases. This may partially explain the Supreme
Court's recent rejection of the "clear and present danger'' test in
political advocacy cases, 101 and its strong support for the regulation
of false and misleading advertising in the commercial context. 102 As
Professor Scanlon has stated, ''where political issues are involved
governments are notoriouosly partisan and unreliable." 103 But
Scanlon is wrong to suggest that the government bias argument supports his treatment of commercial and political speech as distinct
97. The phrase "mutually affecting" and, to some extent, my method of analysis are drawn
from P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (reviewed in this issue); see also Bobbitt, A
Reply to Professor JJall, 59 TEXAS L. REv. 829, 830 (1981).
98. Scanlon, supra note 11, at 525.
99. Professor Scanlon puts the matter this way:
What I conclude from this is that the distinction between expression and other forms of
actions is less important than the distinction between expression which moves others to
act by pointing out what they take to be good reasons for action and expression which
gives rise to action by others in other ways, e.g., by providing them with the means to do
what they wanted to do anyway.
• . . A person who acts on reasons he has acquired from another's act of expression acts
on what he has come to believe and has judged to be a sufficient basis for action. The
contribution to the genesis of his action made by the act of expression is, so to speak,
superseded by the agent's own judgment . . . .
Scanlon, supra note 61 at 212.
100. See id at 209.
101. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969). See generally Linde, "Clear and Present .Danger" Reexamined: .Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).
102. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 775-81
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
I 03. Scanlon, supra note 11, at 534. Ironically, Scanlon does not assimilate such speech to
his judgment-distortion justification for censorship. Id at 525.
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categories. 104 Consider, for example, the differences in the judicial
attitude toward different types of commercial speech. Judges may
trust more the competence of government officials when they seek to
protect listeners against judgment distorting commercial speech, for
example fraudulent representations, than when they seek to regulate
commercial speech bearing on a controversial public policy issue (for
example, energy consumption). 105 Perhaps cases involving commercial speech advocating a harmful activity are more difficult, e.g., cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption. But unlike Professor
Scanlon, who is troubled by a free speech principle that prevents
'justified paternalism," 106 I see political advocacy of totalitarianism
and commercial advocacy of harmful substances as indistinguishable
in terms of 'justified paternalism." His categories of speech are entirely unhelpful. If there is a principled distinction, it lies in the potential for government bias, and this depends on the particular
matters addressed by the speech.
But there should be no mistake about the fact that a holistic approach would raise many issues that,. heretofore, have been largely
ignored. Traditional categorizations of expression would need to be
reexamined. For example, collective bargaining inevitably invokes
the self-governing value of free speech. Yet there are many instances
of the regulation of speech in this context. Secondary boycotts and
picketing may be prohibited. The classification of topics as
mandatory, permissive, or illegal subjects of collective bargaining
may penalize participants for their expression. The employer's
threats to close the plant or to fire employees, if they vote to be represented by a union, may be unfair labor practices. 107 Since collective bargaining is a governance mechanism, free speech theorists
should reflect upon the legitimacy of such regulatory practices in the
labor law field.

VII
The Bible reminds us that "of making many books there is no
end, and much study is a weariness of the fiesh." 108 If so, Professor
Schauer should be happily weary, for his book reflects enormous effort and dedication to scholarship. But he is more interested in criticizing concepts than he is in espousing them or in applying them to
104. Id. at 537-42.
105. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn. of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
106. Scanlon, supra note 11, at 532. See generally Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
107. See Swift, NLRB Overkill· Predictions of Plant Relocation and Closure and Employer
Free Speech, 8 GA. L. REv. 77 (1973).
108. Ecclesiastes 12:12.
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concrete speech problems. The last half of his book, which provides
a careful and balanced perspective on current free speech issues, is
almost entirely disconnected from the first half. As he discusses such
issues as the scope of free speech, rights of access to the mass media,
pornography, prior restraints, and the like, there are few references
to the philosophical arguments from uncertainty, democracy, and
governmental incompetence. He is no longer the perfectionist, and
at one point, he confesses that he is engaged in "intelligent balancing" (p. 144). Once again, two Frederick Schauers emerge. The first
is deeply troubled by the conceptional moorings of free speech; he is
a skeptic who is not quite sure that a defensible free speech principle
exists. The second Frederick Schauer is a lawyer who accepts, on
balance, the need to protect broadly freedom of expression. The first
Schauer is the more interesting and provocative; the second comes
closer to a defensible free speech principle.
But whatever his shortcomings, Professor Schauer has made an
enormous contribution to our understanding of the concepts that underlie freedom of expression. As George Orwell once said of
Charles Dickens, he "is one of those writers who are well worth
stealing." 109 For years to come, legal scholars, students, and judges
will be borrowing from Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. Few
will agree with all of Professor Schauer's conclusions, for he attempts to map a terrain too treacherous for all but the most courageous. Although he refuses to obfuscate his vision with the rosecolored glasses of the true-believers 110 or with the ideological blinders of libertarians and critical legal theorists, partisans of all persuasions will be enriched by his efforts.

109. G. Orwell, Charles Dickens, in A COLLECTION OF EsSAYS BY GEORGE ORWELL 48
(1954).
110. "The Devil is not the Prince of Matter; the Devil is the arrogance of the spirit, faith
without smile, truth that is never seized by doubt." u. Eco, THE NAME OF THE ROSE 477
(1983).

